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CAN GLOBAL IMBALANCES 
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ECONOMY
dimitri b. papadimitriou,gennaro zezza, and greg hannsgen
In this new Strategic Analysis,we review what we believe is the most important economic issue facing
policymakers in the United States and abroad:the prospect of a growth recession in the United States
linked to imbalances in the U.S.current account,government,and private sector deficits.The current
account balance,which is a deduction from U.S.aggregate demand,has been rising steadily for some
time and is now likely to be above 6.5 percent of GDP.The government balance has improved,again
giving no stimulus to demand,which has therefore relied entirely on a large and growing private sector
deficit.A rapidly cooling housing market is one of the signs that this growth path is likely to break down.
We focus first on the current account deficit. Our analysis suggests that a necessary and suf-
ficient condition for addressing this problem without incurring dire consequences is sufficient
export growth. To achieve this, foreign saving has to fall, especially in Europe and East Asia; U.S.
saving has to rise;and some mechanism,such as a change in relative prices,should be put in place
to help the previous two phenomena translate into an improvement in the U.S. balance of trade.
We turn next to the ever-rising growth in private sector debt.As long as interest rates were mov-
ing downward, a larger debt was consistent with stable interest payments, relative to income. Since
interest rates have now stabilized or increased, debt service is taking an increasing share of house-
holds’disposable income, a development that may have negative impacts on consumer demand.
The Three Balances: A Summary of the Issues
The Levy Institute has long pointed out (Godley and Izurieta 2001) that the current account and
private sector imbalances would eventually bring the economy to an unsustainable position, unless
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ance with the balances of the government and the private sector
provides the operational framework that allows us to consider
strategic prospects for the U.S. economy. It is: current account
balance=private sector balance+government balance.
This relationship essentially says that a nation’s net bor-
rowing or lending to other countries is accounted for entirely by
the net borrowing or lending of the government and private
sectors.Of course,the latter includes the personal and corporate
sectors.Hence,it is not surprising that both the private and gov-
ernment sectors have been deeply in deficit in recent years.
Figure 1 shows that the private sector balance has plunged since
2003. The government deficit fell below zero late in the Clinton
administration (deficits appear as positive numbers in the fig-
ure), rose as the nation fell into recession and the Bush admin-
istration’s Keynesian fiscal policy stance went into effect, and
has followed a downward trend in recent years.
The Current Account Deficit: Recent Data 
and Commentary
The total U.S. debt relative to GDP, as shown in Figure 2, rose
almost continuously up to 2002,when it stabilized due to the fall
in the dollar (Figure 3). Figure 2 includes several measures of
total U.S.net debt.One is our calculation of the sum of past cur-
rent account balances. The justification for the use of this figure
is obvious: one’s total debt could be very roughly approximated
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corrective actions were taken. Today, the current account imbal-
ance is being widely discussed, although most commentators
attribute it to excessive saving rates abroad, rather than to an
inadequate saving rate at home.
In this section, we provide some background on the issues
that have seemed most crucial to us for some time but are only
now gaining wider attention, such as the current account
deficit.1A long-festering problem,the current account deficit is
the amount by which imports exceed exports, plus the balance
of cross-border flows of certain forms of income,such as inter-
est payments. As long as the nation runs a current account
deficit, it must sell assets to the rest of the world to finance a
portion of its imports and international income payments.The
United States has been running deficits on the current account
since the early 1990s, and in the final quarter of last year, the
deficit reached a record 6.8 percent of GDP,as seen in Figure 1.
After a tiny reversal in the first quarter of this year, the balance
resumed its fall in the second quarter, reaching a deficit of
approximately 6.4 percent at an annual rate. Monthly data are
not available for the current account balance, but the trade
deficit reached $64 billion in September, an indication that no
change in the trend is near. Preliminary estimates of the cur-
rent account deficit for the third quarter show no signs of
improvement.
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tion—and hence generates a rise in U.S. interest rates, which in
turn depresses domestic demand and growth.The ultimate out-
come might then be a recession in the United States that spreads
to its trading partners and the world. A devaluation of the dol-
lar might also affect U.S. inflation via an increase in import
prices,again triggering a restrictive monetary policy.We discuss
the mechanics of this scenario below,but it is important to note
the diverse views that exist on the topic of the current account
balance and the potential for a devaluation.
Commentators disagree on several points. First, they dis-
agree about the linkage between the U.S. external imbalance
and the value of the U.S. dollar and whether the deficit will
generate a dollar devaluation.Second,they argue over the link-
age between a dollar devaluation and the rise in U.S. inflation
and interest rates. Third, they have not come to an agreement
about whether the external imbalance arose in the first place
because of problems abroad or in the United States.If the deficit
reflects problems abroad—as some commentators argue—no
action should be taken in the United States.These commentators
believe that the external imbalance is generated by unattractive
capital markets in East Asia,which create excess demand for U.S.
financial assets. Heightened demand for U.S. securities, in turn,
keeps the dollar strong, leading to a deficit in the U.S. balance of
trade. Finally, the experts quarrel about whether the imbalances
will self-correct through the unaided action of free markets or
require policy intervention.
Federal Reserve officials have been focusing primarily on
inflation; when they address the issue of the current account
deficit,they remain sanguine.Recent speeches by Richard Fisher,
Michael Moskow, and Janet Yellen, the heads of the Dallas,
Chicago, and San Francisco Federal Reserve Banks, respectively,
and Donald Kohn, vice chairman of the Board of Governors,
have heavily emphasized the risks of inflation and the housing
market (Fisher 2006; Kohn 2006a; Moskow 2006; Yellen 2006),
reflecting the belief of most central bankers that price stability is
their primary responsibility. On the other hand, Kohn (2006b)
has devoted attention to the current account deficit. He warns
that the U.S. saving rate will inevitably rise in the coming years,
reducing the imbalance. He also warns of a possible interna-
tional sell-off of dollar-denominated bonds. Kohn still empha-
sizes the importance of containing inflation, arguing that a loss
of price stability could undermine demand for the dollar, just as
it did in the early 1970s.
by the cumulative amount one has borrowed over time. The
other lines are the commonly cited Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) data on the U.S. “net investment position,” with direct
investment calculated at current cost and at market value. The
latter two measures differ because the market value of securities
is affected by fluctuations in equity markets. The discrepancy
between our measure and the BEA’s current-cost figure amounts
to roughly $1.8 trillion at the end of 2005. The key problem in
reconciling these two series is that they are based on entirely sep-
arate forms of data: the net investment position is calculated
using surveys of custodians in the United States who hold secu-
rities on behalf of foreign investors; the capital account balance
is based on information provided by brokers who sell securities
to foreigners.Other differences arise in accounting for real estate
transfers. Finally, our estimate of total indebtedness is not
affected by changes in the value of the U.S. dollar. The BEA net
investment position measures,on the other hand,fall with a dol-
lar devaluation. The reason is that most U.S. assets abroad are
held in foreign currency, so their dollar value increases as the
dollar devalues, while U.S. debt is denominated in dollars and is
therefore not affected by movements in the exchange rate. This
phenomenon is reflected in the figure by the fact that the net
national debt has flattened out in recent years,according to BEA
measures, as the dollar has fallen in value.2
There is no general consensus that a large and rising U.S.
current account deficit poses a threat requiring a policy response.
The imbalance will pose a threat if it makes U.S. assets unat-
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account deficit is being driven not by imports but by the attrac-
tiveness of U.S. assets, which is due to superior productivity
growth and deeper, more highly developed financial markets
(pp. 33–37). However, the report also includes a scenario in
which there is a reduced world appetite for U.S.assets.The “dis-
ruptive adjustment scenario” described by the IMF includes 
a two-year period with an average economic growth rate of
1 percent, with even worse outcomes possible, including a
major disruption of financial markets or a wave of damaging
protectionism. In recent speeches, Rodrigo de Rato, managing
director of the Fund,has also warned of a disruptive adjustment
(2006a, 2006b, 2006c).
In a recent paper, Richard H. Clarida, Manuela Goretti,
and Mark P.Taylor express optimism about the sustainability of
large current account deficits, even though the deficit is cur-
rently above the estimated threshold beyond which adjustment
has historically taken place (2006).First,as we pointed out above,
since most U.S. debt is denominated in dollars and most U.S.
foreign assets are denominated in foreign currency, the coun-
try’s net asset position (assets minus liabilities) rises upon a
devaluation. Second, the United States has received relatively
high returns on its outward direct investment. Third, the world
economy has seen a “glut”of savings relative to investment oppor-
tunities in recent years.Thus,while Clarida,Goretti,and Taylor
acknowledge that the current account deficit cannot balloon
out of control indefinitely,they argue that there are clear expla-
nations for the lack of an adjustment up to this point.However,
it is not clear to us that historical experience can offer much
guidance in today’s unprecedented economic climate.
Wynne Godley and Marc Lavoie recently clarified an impor-
tant implication of current account balances, using a relatively
simple,stock-flow consistent model (2005–06).It is often asserted
that when China receives a positive flow of reserves from the
United States, it risks a bout of inflation. The reason is that
when the central bank buys dollars with its own currency, the
domestic supply of yuan rises. The only way to prevent a per-
nicious rise in the Chinese money supply is for the Chinese
central bank to sell bonds to domestic holders of its currency,
“soaking up”the “extra”yuan.Godley and Lavoie show that the
latter process, known in the economics literature as “steriliza-
tion,” can occur naturally, as a byproduct of interest rate tar-
geting by the Chinese central bank. This finding suggests an
emphasis on other consequences of imbalances is warranted: if
current Chinese policy runs into trouble,it will not likely come
The current account imbalance was not the main topic of
discussion at the annual Jackson Hole meeting of central
bankers in August, but it was brought up by Martin Feldstein
of Harvard University (2006), who staked out a similar posi-
tion to that of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2006).
He stated that the adjustment back toward balance will be
accompanied by at least one of two changes: a fall in demand
for U.S.assets or a fall in the value of the dollar (pp.10–11).He
believes that in the near future, the Fed might face a dilemma:
higher interest rates would be needed to fight the inflationary
effects of devaluation,while weak demand would appear to call
for looser policy.
Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser (2005) have shown that
the perennial imbalances are fed largely by purchases of dollars
by foreign central banks, undertaken to prevent a devaluation.
Moreover, private investors abroad, who hold part of the for-
eign debt,have been encouraged by the commitment of central
banks to prop up the value of U.S. securities. Hence, the dollar
has been supported artificially, not by the intrinsic value of
U.S. securities. Should central banks slow their accumulation
of U.S. reserves, private actors could quickly follow their lead
(p.9).Drawing an analogy to the “prisoners’dilemma”of game
theory, Roubini and Setser point out that smaller central
banks’collective interest in maintaining the value of the dollar
might lose out to their individual interests in protecting their
wealth, should banks become convinced that a massive “run
for the exits”was imminent (p. 25).
Increasingly, high officials in international financial insti-
tutions have sounded the alarm about the current account
deficit.In a recent report,the IMF pointed out that “past expe-
rience suggests that high current account deficits relative to
GDP have typically not been sustained for long periods”(2006,
p. 13). The report notes several factors pointing in the direc-
tion of a prompt adjustment—including the falling U.S.
exchange rate, stronger growth in U.S. exports, positive news
on the federal deficit, and stronger growth in Japan and the
euro area—but observes that the current account deficit
remains stubbornly high.
Like the Fed officials mentioned earlier, the IMF report
argues that a “gradual, orderly unwinding”is most likely (2006,
p. 16). It states that the unwinding process may be accom-
plished spontaneously by the market, rather than by govern-
ment intervention. In concert with some official documents of
the Bush administration, the report argues that the currentin the form of “excess” money. But while heavy Chinese pur-
chases of dollars may continue for a long while without trig-
gering inflation, we remain convinced, for other reasons, that
an endless accumulation of dollars in foreign central banks
cannot occur.
Some crucial data can be brought to bear on the issues dis-
cussed in this section.Figure 3 shows the paths of the exchange
rate of the dollar against three baskets of currencies: the
“major” currencies, which include most of the Western indus-
trialized countries and Japan; the currencies of “other impor-
tant” trading partners, which include many emerging markets
and China; and a “broad” measure, combining both “major”
and “other”nations’ currencies.
Some progress has been made toward a devaluation, as
shown in Figure 3. First, the dollar has been falling against the
major currencies for some time, with a brief respite in 2005.
Second, the kind of abrupt drop feared by many analysts has
not materialized so far.While the dollar has fallen significantly
against the major currencies, its exchange rate with other cur-
rencies remains stable.
Potentially, a devaluation is both part of the problem and
part of the solution to chronic current account imbalances.It is
a potential problem because it could raise interest rates and,
hence, the cost of servicing the national debt. The scenario that
worries some observers involves a sudden collapse in the dollar,
rather than an orderly adjustment. Concern about the dollar
could lead investors to dump dollar-denominated assets, forc-
ing down their prices. Since interest rates move inversely with
the price of bonds, U.S. business and the federal government
would then have to pay more to borrow.An additional worry is
that a lower exchange rate makes foreign goods more expensive
to those whose incomes come in the form of dollars, feeding
inflation.
On the other hand, a devaluation is potentially part of the
solution to the nation’s strategic predicament because goods
and services produced by the United States become cheaper for
citizens of other countries when dollars become cheaper. Also,
higher import prices discourage U.S. citizens from purchasing
imports, with the beneficial effect of increasing demand for
domestically produced goods. Finally, a devaluation improves
the U.S. net asset position—the value of its foreign assets
minus its foreign liabilities, translated into dollars.
A numerical example provides a sense of the magnitude of
this last beneficial effect of a devaluation. Since U.S. assets—
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mostly denominated in foreign currency—are equal to approx-
imately 90 percent of GDP, a 20 percent devaluation over 4
years would increase the value of these assets by $2 trillion, or
18 percent of GDP.The net debt would then fall by roughly the
same amount. Interest payments on U.S. assets abroad would
also rise in terms of dollars.
Hence, a devaluation has some ill effects, but it is one of
the few tonics available to force an improvement in the current
account balance and the U.S. net asset position. As long as it
occurs gradually, a crash in financial markets and a sharp rise
in interest rates would be avoided.
Our own concerns about the three balances focus less on
inflation and disorderly adjustments,instead emphasizing issues
of aggregate demand. Private sector and government borrowing
have been the motor driving the American economy; when bor-
rowing drops, demand for goods and services in the United
States and its trading partners will fall, raising the specter of
recession.
Too Late for Reform?
Many proposals have been made for measures to deal with the
international imbalances discussed above. Any potential rem-
edy must cause three events to occur: foreign saving must fall,
U.S. saving must rise, and the dollar will have to fall. The third
change,as explained in an earlier section,will be needed to help
bring about the first two.
De Rato (2006c) cites efforts at the IMF to initiate multi-
lateral meetings to address this problem through coordinated
efforts.We have long advocated a multilateral solution, though
we are not sure that the will exists to achieve this (Godley,
Izurieta, and Zezza 2004; Godley et al. 2005, p. 2). An appro-
priate international approach might involve cooperative efforts
to improve demand for imported goods in nations that are
now selling more goods abroad than they are buying and to
devalue the dollar.
Such proposals are constructive, but many officials are
emphasizing what we regard as less promising solutions. The
IMF report is typical in many ways.It lists a number of propos-
als: efforts to boost U.S. national saving, including cuts in the
federal budget deficit;“structural reforms”in Japan and Europe;
increased domestic demand in emerging Asia (consumption in
China and investment elsewhere);greater exchange rate flexibil-
ity; and increased spending by oil exporters (2006, pp. 28–29).The Private Sector Balance: The Risks Ahead
Figure 4 shows the private sector counterpart of the budget
deficit,broken into its two components,personal and corporate.
The entire deficit of this sector is accounted for by its personal
component, with the corporate sector actually running a sur-
plus. A close-up view of the personal sector’s borrowing is
revealed in Figure 5, where this time the denominator is a proxy
for households’ability to pay off debt—their disposable income.
Borrowing has fallen by this measure over the last two quarters,
though in the past, sharp falls in borrowing have often been fol-
lowed closely by increases.Nonetheless,borrowing remains very
high by historical standards. Figure 6 shows the stock of house-
hold debt as a ratio to the same relevant flow:personal disposable
income. Recall Godley and Francis Cripps’s (1983) key insight:
stocks do not increase relative to flows forever.
A further indication of the pressure mounting on the U.S.
consumer is the debt-service ratio, which is the cost of servic-
ing debt, divided by disposable income. This figure has been
rising steadily since the first quarter of 2005 and now stands at
14.10 percent.
We must emphasize that our primary concern about the
rising level of debt is the one emphasized by the late Levy
Institute economist Hyman P. Minsky: the possibility of an
aftermath in which there is such a dearth of spending that the
economy goes into a recession and individual households are
6 Strategic Analysis, November 2006
Of these prescriptions,we support exchange rate flexibility
and increased demand abroad, but we doubt the effectiveness
of structural reforms. Also, although we expect that at some
point the household sector will have to repair its fragile balance
sheet, we believe the inevitable adjustment in domestic saving
could have bad effects as well as good ones, specifically with
regard to aggregate demand. For this reason, export demand
will remain crucial.
The term “structural reforms” generally refers to efforts to
scale back social programs, labor market protections, and regu-
lation, in order to spur domestic investment. Many believe
reforms would enable Europe and Japan to attract more foreign
capital.The evidence that such measures reduce unemployment
is weak (Howell et al. 2006). By reducing wages, reforms may
depress world demand for goods and services, including U.S.
exports, and cause surplus nations to become even more reliant
upon exports to fuel their economies.
Another measure supported by the IMF and many other
commentators is a reduction in government budget deficits. By
the accounting identity, if the private sector balance remains
constant, a fall in the government deficit improves the current
account balance. But the private sector balance may not remain
constant. Hence, a fall in the government budget deficit can
come at the cost of a rising private sector deficit, failing to
improve the current account balance (Barbosa-Filho et al.2005).
Another problem with a fiscal solution is that it can have a
depressing effect on aggregate demand, a development that
could lead to a recession, with large attendant social costs.
A devaluation, on the other hand, offers a way out of the
current account bind, without stifling aggregate demand. The
way forward,we believe,will involve orderly devaluation,stim-
ulative macroeconomic policy abroad, and an increase in the
saving of U.S.households.If a devaluation remains elusive,non-
selective tariffs could be used as a last resort, as we have argued
before (Godley, Papadimitriou, Dos Santos, and Zezza 2005).
Finally,looser monetary policy might help,as we explain below.
Many other proffered solutions, by themselves, will not bring
about the necessary adjustment without sending the economy
into a tailspin.
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and authors’ calculations caught in a vise of financial obligations and insufficient income
(1986, chapter 9).
This brings us to the issue of housing. In January 2006, we
wrote about the role of housing-related debt in the finances of
private households and the potential effect of a fall in house
prices on the net worth of the household sector (Papadimitriou,
Chilcote, and Zezza 2006). Partly because residential housing
investment has accounted for 30 percent of gross private invest-
ment and 5 percent of total domestic output over the last 25
years (Krainer 2006), we still believe that developments in this
sector will be crucial in the months to come. Unfortunately, the
period since January has brought only further confirmation that
a major downturn in the residential real estate sector is coming.
The rise in housing price indexes has decelerated rapidly.
Two main indexes match data on sales of the same home over
time.One of these indexes,constructed by the Office of Housing
Enterprise and Oversight,shows an appreciation of 1.17 percent
in the second quarter of 2006 over the previous quarter. The
decline in the quarterly rate of housing price increases was the
sharpest since the index was first calculated in 1975. The second
index,developed by Karl E.Case and Robert J.Shiller and calcu-
lated by Standard and Poor’s,shows that while housing inflation
was 20.4 percent in the 12 months ending in July 2004, the rate
of increase in prices slowed to 8.2 percent in the 12 months end-
ing in June 2006.Six of the 10 cities in the Case/Shiller–Standard
and Poor’s index actually saw declines between May and June.
More recent data are available for new home prices.
Commerce Department data show that the median price of a
new home fell 9.7 percent from September 2005 to September
2006, the largest drop in 35 years (Associated Press 2006b).
So far, no free fall has occurred, at least according to the
more reliable, resale data. But there are important differences
between the housing market and markets for financial securi-
ties (Case and Shiller 2006). Financial markets clear almost
instantaneously, with no unsold inventories. Hence, if there is
a large-scale sell-off, prices fall very quickly, so that every seller
can find a buyer. On the other hand, if the housing market
faces a decline in demand, it may be felt first as a rise in unsold
inventories, as sellers hold on to their properties rather than
accept a low price. Until inventories are worked off, prices may
not fall drastically. This may be one reason why quantity indi-
cators, such as the volume of unsold inventories, have histori-
cally served as superior leading indicators of slumps in
residential construction (Krainer 2006).
And those indicators are not hopeful. Sales of existing
homes fell by 4.1 percent from June to July, according to the
National Association of Realtors. The same report showed that
the inventory of unsold homes rose to a record high of 3.86
million in July.Fed chair Ben S.Bernanke stated in late July that
the decline in the housing market appeared so far to be
“orderly,” but that the Fed is “watching [the risk of a housing
slowdown] very carefully”(Associated Press 2006a).Recently it
was reported that housing starts fell 6 percent in August from
a month earlier (Gerena-Morales 2006).
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
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and authors’ calculationsand how fast long rates adjust as the effects of federal funds rate
hikes work their way through the financial markets. Many
expect the Fed to begin lowering interest rates by next year,but
as we have seen, most Fed officials remain vexed by the possi-
bility of renewed inflation,a somewhat overdrawn concern that
has tied their hands for the moment.
Having laid out the case for a housing-led decline in the
economy, we must note one positive development in recent
months: the rise of the stock market to all-time highs (at least
by some measures). While more households hold significant
amounts of home equity than significant amounts of stocks, a
healthy equity market is capable of mollifying the impact of
housing market torpor. But no one can be assured that the
equity markets will not fall as well.
Baseline Scenario: CBO Budget Deficit and Growth
Assumptions with No Devaluation
How will all these trends play out over the next few years? We
now analyze certain scenarios, based upon varying assump-
tions, using the Levy Institute macro model. The idea is not to
make a forecast,but to explore the possibilities that exist in sev-
eral different hypothetical situations.
The first scenario is based upon the CBO’s (2006) rather
optimistic view. We adopt that agency’s projections for the
growth rate of economic output, inflation, and fiscal policy:
real GDP growth will be 3.5 percent in 2006 and 3.0 percent in
2007 to 2010; Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation will be 3.5
8 Strategic Analysis, November 2006
In our January Strategic Analysis, we calculated that a 10
percent drop in housing prices would reduce homeowners’
equity by nearly $2 trillion.This is a larger impact than a 10 per-
cent drop in the stock market. As we pointed out in the previ-
ous analysis, property values are important for more than one
reason. In the Levy Institute macro model and in most other
models, household net worth, including housing equity, is an
important variable driving consumer expenditures.Economists
believe this is so for several reasons.First,higher net worth sim-
ply provides more wherewithal to make purchases.According to
standard macroeconomics textbooks, when people’s homes rise
in value, they feel richer and are likely to spend more. Second,
housing wealth can be leveraged as collateral to spend with bor-
rowed money. Third, as a corollary of the second point, when
collateral is rising in value, banks’ portfolios of loans have a
higher value, other things being equal. In the event that a bor-
rower defaults,the bank can recover its loss by selling the collat-
eral. Thus, it is probably no accident that the housing market
run-up has been accompanied by the borrowing binge of U.S.
households shown in Figure 5,which is largely accounted for by
loans collateralized with home equity.
For several reasons,the economy is more vulnerable than it
has been in the past to falling home prices. Never before has an
economic expansion been so dependent on home equity loans
and cash-out mortgage refinancing.Problems with defaults could
arise owing to a wave of interest rate increases in variable-rate
mortgages, which have become increasingly popular in the last
five years or so (Darlin 2006). Interest rates on variable-rate
mortgages generally “reset”after three, five, seven, or ten years.
With rising interest rates, many homeowners holding variable-
rate mortgages will face higher payments—unless they refi-
nance their loans, paying them off more slowly to compensate
for higher interest rates. But if the market value of the home
falls below the amount of the mortgage, refinancing will prove
impossible,and the homeowner may have no choice but to sell.
Such sales would have the tendency to put further downward
pressure on home prices. Thus, rising interest rates and falling
property values could have a synergistic negative effect on house-
hold expenditure, a possibility explored in our scenario analysis.
As seen in Figure 7, short-term interest rates have risen
about 4.25 percent over the last two and a half years.As of now,
longer-term rates,such as mortgage rates,have not risen as fast,
and in fact,many long-term rates are actually below short-term
ones. The effects of monetary policy will depend upon how far
Figure 7 Selected Interest Rates
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percent this year, 2.5 percent in 2007, and 2.2 percent in the
next three years; and the government deficit will be stable. In
addition, the projection assumes stable interest and exchange
rates,in order to concentrate on other factors.We allow corpo-
rate borrowing to maintain its current trend. Taking as given
the government deficit projected by the CBO, we calculate the
necessary increase in private expenditure, fueled by household
borrowing, that would be required to achieve the growth path
assumed by the CBO. Our assumptions for economic growth
abroad are shown in Table 1.
Our projections for the three financial balances, based on
these assumptions, are shown in Figure 8. Because growth in the
United States will lag that of our trading partners, U.S. exports
will rise much faster than imports,stabilizing the current account
deficit.This pattern has already emerged in 2006.Specifically,the
current account balance will hover around 6.2 to 6.3 percent in
2007 to 2010. Combined with the CBO’s projection of a stable
ratio of the government balance to GDP,this implies that all three
balances will flatten out over the next four years.The government
deficit will reach about 2.3 percent in 2006 and fall to around 2.0
percent in 2010,and the private sector deficit improves by around
.25 percent in 2007, then gradually rises about half a percentage
point to a deficit of over 4 percent.
Is this growth path sustainable? For any debtor, if borrow-
ing grows faster than income,the debt-to-income ratio will rise
without limit,eventually leading to default.This dynamic is the
result of simple accounting and does not require any theoretical
assumptions. Consider the following simplified assumptions: a
Table 1 Baseline Forecasts 
GDP Growth (percent) Inflation (percent change in GDP deflator)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Eurozone 2.3 1.8 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0
BRICs
Brazil 3.6 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.7 4.0 3.0 2.0 2.0
Russia 6.5 6.5 4.8 4.5 4.0 15.6 8.9 8.0 7.5 7.0
India 8.3 7.3 7.0 6.5 6.0 5.1 4.7 4.0 3.0 2.0
China 10.0 10.0 9.0 8.0 7.0 1.5 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0
Other ASEAN
Hong Kong 6.0 5.5 5.0 4.5 4.0 0.0 1.3 2.0 2.0 2.0
Indonesia 5.2 6.0 5.5 5.0 4.5 13.3 6.1 5.0 4.0 3.0
Japan 2.8 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.5 2.0
Korea 5.0 4.3 4.0 4.0 4.0 -1.6 1.6 2.0 2.0 2.0
Malaysia 5.5 5.7 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.4 0.8 2.0 2.0 2.0
Philippines 5.0 5.4 5.0 4.5 4.0 6.2 4.9 4.0 3.0 2.0
Singapore 6.9 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.1 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0
Taiwan 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
Other Major U.S. Trade Partners
Australia 3.2 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.2 2.7 2.0 2.0 2.0
Canada 3.1 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0
Mexico 4.0 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.2 2.5 2.0 2.0
United Kingdom 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0
Sources: The Economist, September 16–22, 2006; IMF World Economic Outlook, September 2006; authors’ projectionsmore implausible than the path of the private sector balance
alone would suggest.As we have pointed out, the likely coming
decline in home values would make such loan growth unlikely.
Alternative Scenario 1: Less Household Borrowing
and Continued International Inaction
Since it seems unlikely that household debt will continue to
expand rapidly,we next consider a scenario in which it is assumed
that the private sector experiences a retrenchment. Specifically,
we assume that the drop in household borrowing that took place
in the first two quarters of this year will continue, bringing bor-
rowing down to its early-1990s level and stabilizing household
debt. This path—a decline of roughly 8 percent of GDP relative
to the baseline scenario—can be seen in Figure 10. As stated
above, a reduction in borrowing is a likely consequence of a
downward trend in real estate values, which may have already
begun, and of the already staggering ratios of debt-service pay-
ments to income. This alternative scenario assumes the same
rates of inflation and world GDP growth as in the baseline.
The slow but steady drop in domestic demand would,
according to our projections, lead to a moderate growth reces-
sion, with GDP growth falling below 2 percent through 2007,
then rising to about 2.3 percent.Unemployment could become
a much more serious problem.As shown in Figure 11,both the
current account balance and the private sector balance would
improve dramatically in this scenario: the private sector balance
10 Strategic Analysis, November 2006
current stock of debt at 20 percent of GDP; GDP growing at 3
percent per annum; and a current account balance of negative 6
percent of GDP. These figures approximate actual data for the
U.S. economy. Together, they imply that the ratio of debt to
GDP will rise at 5 percent per year, reaching 50 percent by the
end of the simulation period in 2010.
Figure 9 illustrates the sharp rise in household borrowing
and debt required,under the baseline assumptions,to reach the
growth rates and budget deficits posited by the CBO. If any-
thing, this projection makes the baseline scenario seem even
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and authors’ calculationswould reach -1.2 percent in 2010,while the current account bal-
ance would improve to -4.4 percent.
Projections by Goldman Sachs show a “decoupling” of
growth in the United States from that in the rest of the world,
meaning that the rest of the world will not be greatly affected
by the U.S. slowdown (2006, p. 1). Goldman Sachs expects a
decoupling partly because any U.S. slowdown will likely be
concentrated in housing and related industries, which are less
closely linked with foreign economies than other sectors. We
follow the “decoupling hypothesis” by letting GDP growth in
U.S. trading partners stay the same as in Table 1.
Alternative Scenario 2: A Slump in Domestic
Borrowing with Strong Growth Abroad and Further
Devaluation
What would it take to generate a better growth outcome for the
United States? In our second alternative scenario,we investigate
the consequences of more optimistic growth assumptions in the
rest of the world. We drop the hypothesis that growth will slow
in developing countries and assume faster growth in the euro
area. This set of assumptions is shown in Table 2. Faster growth
worldwide has a tendency to increase demand for U.S. exports,
allowing an improvement in the current account balance, with
smaller cuts in U.S.import demand.We assume that the weight
of each U.S.trading partner in U.S.exports remains the same as
in 2006. The effects of our simulation would thus be strength-
ened if the share of U.S.exports going to fast-growing countries
increased.
We also assume that the dollar will lose 10 percent of its
value per year against the pound and euro during the next two
years. We suppose that the dollar will depreciate 5 percent per
year against the Chinese yuan and the currencies of our other
main Asian trading partners. The simulation is done under the
assumption that the devaluation of the dollar will not have an
adverse effect on inflation in the United States. We retain the
assumption that household borrowing contracts, as in the pre-
vious scenario.
The results of the simulation of Alternative Scenario 2 are
also shown in Figure 11.As in the previous scenario,GDP growth
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 11
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Table 2 Alternative Assumptions for World GDP Growth
GDP Growth (percent)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Eurozone 2.3 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0
BRICs
Brazil 3.6 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Russia 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
India 8.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
China 10.0 10.0 9.0 9.0 9.0
Other ASEAN
Hong Kong 6.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
Indonesia 5.2 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
Japan 2.8 2.3 2.5 3.0 3.0
Korea 5.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Malaysia 5.5 5.7 5.0 5.0 5.0
Philippines 5.0 5.4 5.0 5.0 5.0
Singapore 6.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Taiwan 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.0 4.0
Other Major U.S.
Trade Partners
Australia 3.2 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.0
Canada 3.1 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0
Mexico 4.0 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.0
United Kingdom 2.6 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0
Source: See textfalls to about 1.6 percent, but it returns toward its trend level
(around 2.8 percent) much more rapidly. Unsurprisingly, given
our favorable assumptions about world growth and the falling
dollar, the current account moves toward balance faster than in
the previous scenario, rising from -6.3 percent in 2006 to -5.5
percent the following year, and then to -4.7 percent, -4.0 per-
cent, and -3.4 percent. As Figure 12 shows, this more rapid
improvement in the current account balance is driven by
stronger export growth; relative to GDP,exports are nearly 1 per-
cent higher in this scenario by the end of the simulation period.
The recovery in the current account balance is reflected by a
steady rise of the private sector balance from -3.9 percent in 2006
to -.9 percent in 2010. Finally, though the government deficit is
higher than in the baseline scenario, it shows an improvement
over Alternative Scenario 1.
For reasons we have already discussed,the current account
balance might improve even faster and by a larger amount in
this scenario than our simulations indicate.A devaluation low-
ers the dollar value of net foreign debt. Furthermore, income
flows from these assets, measured in dollars, also rise. Our sec-
ond alternative simulation does not take into account these
additional benefits of a devaluation.
But how would a dollar devaluation be brought about? As
discussed in previous sections, for given interest rates, interna-
tional demand for U.S. assets is strong enough to offset the
supply of dollars generated by the growing U.S. trade deficit.A
decline in U.S. interest rates may therefore be beneficial: it will
reduce the attractiveness of U.S. bonds to foreign investors,
paving the way for a dollar devaluation. Meanwhile, it would
reduce the burden of interest payments on the consumer, pos-
sibly moderating the inevitable drop in borrowing that we
model in the last two scenarios.
This simulation also demonstrates that faster growth and
a devaluation would have very significant beneficial effects for
the economy’s most serious problems,although these measures
will not offset the expected drop in private demand simulated
in our previous scenario. If the U.S. targets for growth and
unemployment depicted in our baseline are to be met, a more
expansionary fiscal policy should be pursued. We believe that
there is ample room for more expansionary fiscal and mone-
tary policies in Asia and Europe to help achieve an acceleration
and a movement toward correction of the world imbalances.
Concluding Remarks
This strategic analysis has explored some possibilities for the
U.S. economy over the next several years. Both our analysis of
world and national opinion and our simulations make it clear
that a growth recession is a very strong possibility, particularly
in light of the indebted condition of the U.S. consumer. On 
the upside, our second alternative scenario shows the power of
favorable events in the international environment: further dol-
lar devaluation and relatively high growth in the euro area and
the developing world. But these events may not occur without
internationally coordinated policy action, something we have
repeatedly advocated. There is also significant downside risk,
as seen in the baseline and first alternative scenarios. All of our 
scenarios in this analysis use relatively conservative assumptions
regarding interest rates, oil prices, asset prices, and exchange
rates. Should these prove overly optimistic, our analysis indi-
cates a serious probability of a recession. Even though we can-
not precisely forecast the timing, it behooves us all to be ready
for it and to have considered policies to deal with it.
We must be clear about the time scale to which our analy-
sis applies. We are not short-term forecasters, though we will
look vacuous if we do not take some kind of view about
prospects over the next two years—as a byproduct of taking a
view about strategic prospects over the next four to five years.
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Imports - Scenario 1 and Historical
Imports - Scenario 2
Exports - Scenario 1 and Historical
Exports - Scenario 2
 
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and authors’ calculationsUp to now,it has been our view and that of others that the
external deficit has been a danger to the United States, mainly
for the same reason that all agents with rising indebtedness are
in danger—namely, that debts have to be serviced. If debts did
not have to be serviced,they would not matter at all; the debtor
would, in effect, have received a gift. There has also been a lot
of concern that the deficit (which requires the United States to
borrow $2 billion per day, among other consequences) would
eventually cause a “disorderly”collapse in the dollar.
But what has actually happened over the last few years,
contrary to what we expected, is that the large and rising
deficits have not resulted in much increase in U.S. net debt (as
a percent of GDP).This is due to revaluations (partly the result
of relatively small dollar devaluations) and (partly for the same
reason) the fact that deficits have not caused the net flow of
interest payments to deteriorate. These net flows remain obsti-
nately close to zero.
There has been no disorderly collapse in the dollar because
the surplus countries have deliberately been accumulating dollar
assets on a vast scale. They have done this precisely to prevent
their currencies from appreciating (and,therefore,to prevent the
dollar from falling too much) because, for mercantilist reasons,
they want to increase their net exports of manufactures. (There
is no analogy with the deficits of weak or developing economies,
which do have to service and repay their debts.) 
Is there any reason to suppose that this situation will change
during the next five years? Obviously, the situation may change,
as we have suggested,but we certainly should not base our mes-
sage on any strong presumption that it will.There is always the
possibility that there will be a big fall in the dollar, but would
this really matter? There would be some advantages if this hap-
pened. Net export demand would rise. The net foreign invest-
ment position and net flows of interest would benefit hugely.
There would be some addition to inflation but it probably
would not be that large (a very large fall in the dollar occurred
in the mid-1980s without any great adverse consequences).
Nominal interest rates would go up, however, which would
aggravate the private debt position.
The bottom line,so far,is that concern about global imbal-
ances is largely misplaced when considering the next four to
five years.
What would not be misplaced,however,would be concern
that the deficit, taken by itself, is subtracting 6.5 percent from
total demand, and that the show is therefore being kept on the
road only because personal income less personal expenditure
(including investment, i.e., net saving) is deeply negative.
It is our view that as housing equity falls, the debt/income
ratio will rise less fast or even fall. This would cause a big drop
in net lending,leading to recession,from which there is no rea-
son to expect a “bounce back,” because the saving ratio would
only be returning to normal.
Is it realistic to suppose that there could be a renewed stim-
ulus from fiscal policy? We do not think this possibility should
be ruled out; the arguments against it are almost entirely “polit-
ical.” Faced with stubbornly rising unemployment, the govern-
ment might be forced into it, and we think this should be
explicitly recognized. Otherwise, there would be no solution
other than to raise net export demand.But how? A 25 to 30 per-
cent devaluation (disorderly or not) might be the only answer.
However, this too might be difficult to bring about.
Notes
1. See,for example,Godley 2000 and Godley,Papadimitriou,
Dos Santos, and Zezza 2005.
2. Gros (2006) discusses the discrepancies in greater detail
and argues that the balance of payments data is probably
the best measure of the indebtedness of the United States,
and we note that Gros gives an even higher estimate of the
foreign debt than we report.
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